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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Federal Jurisdiction In Domestic Relations Cases
Spindel v. Spindel'
In 1858, in the landmark case of Barber v. Barber,2 the Supreme
Court declared that the jurisdiction of the federal courts did not
extend to the "subject of divorce." Later in the nineteenth century,
the Court, in the case of In re Burrus,3 proclaimed that all matters
concerning "the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child"4 were the exclusive province of state law. The lower federal
courts have generally interpreted the Burrus language as an expansion
of the Barber doctrine and have, for the most part, declined to exercise
diversity jurisdiction over all domestic relations cases.' This judicially
declared exception to federal jurisdiction has been often stated,6 and
occasionally applied,7 but the rationale behind the exception has never
been entirely clear. While some of the reasons employed to justify
the Barber doctrine would exclude all federal jurisdiction over domestic
relations, others would only preclude diversity jurisdiction. Some
argue that there may be absolutely no federal jurisdiction over matri-
monial cases because all questions of domestic relations are reserved
to the states,8 because federal equity jurisdiction as defined by Con-
gress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 does not embrace domestic rela-
tions, 9 or because the federal judiciary has itself renounced any such
jurisdiction.' ° The exercise of diversity jurisdiction in such cases has
encountered additional objections; it has been argued in matrimonial
cases that the wife can have no domicile apart from that of her hus-
band" and that the required jurisdictional amount cannot be satisfied. 12
However, some courts, after duly repeating the Barber doctrine, have
found it inapplicable for a variety of reasons. The most recent such
case is Spindel v. Spindel.'s
1. 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
2. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
3. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
4. Id. at 593-94 (dictum).
5. E.g., Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (paternity and child
support) ; Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967) (custody of children
and visitation rights) ; Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 782 (1947) (suit by illegitimate child against putative father for support
and cost of education) ; In re Barry, 42 F. 113 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844) (habeas corpus
suit for the custody of an infant) ; Bercovitch v. Tanburn, 103 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) (suit by mother-in-law against husband for wife's necessaries).
6. E.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) ; De La Rama v.
De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906) ; Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899) ; Nowell
v. Nowell, 272 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn. 1967); Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F. Supp. 802
(S.D. Iowa 1951).
7. E.g., Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Morris v. Morris, 273
F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
8. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930); Druen v. Druen, 247
F. Supp. 754 (D. Colo. 1965).
9. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 604-05 (1858) (dissenting opinion).
10. In re Freiberg, 262 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. La. 1967),
11. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 600-01 (1858) (dissenting
opinion) ; Bowman v. Bowman, 30 F. 849 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887) (alternative holding).
12. Bowman v. Bowman, 30 F. 849 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887) (alternative holding)
Chappell v. Chappell, 86 Md. 532, 39 A. 984 (1898) (dictum).
13. 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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In Spindel, the plaintiff, a resident of New Mexico, sought a
declaratory judgment in a New York federal district court that the
Mexican divorce her husband had procured was invalid. She alleged
that her consent to the proceedings had been obtained by coercion,
that her husband had induced her to vest a power of attorney in a
Mexican attorney, and that she had withdrawn the power of attorney
before the Mexican lawyer had "represented" her at the divorce
hearing. In addition, the plaintiff sought $500,000 in tort damages,
contending that the defendant had fraudulently induced her to marry
him and had fraudulently divorced her. The sole basis for jurisdiction
was diversity of citizenship. Defendant moved to dismiss, contending,
inter alia, that there could be no federal jurisdiction since the dispute
concerned divorce. Overruling the defendant's motion, the court held
that, since the plaintiff was not seeking a divorce but rather "a deter-
mination of the invalidity of a divorce,"' 4 the Barber doctrine did
not apply.
CONTOURS OF THE Barber DOCTRINE
All discussion of the domestic relations exception to federal
diversity jurisdiction must begin with the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Barber v. Barber.5 Appropriately perhaps,
the Barber doctrine was spawned of dictum. The Court held that a
wife could enforce a valid state alimony decree in a diversity action in
federal court, but prefaced its opinion with the following statement:
Our first remark is - and we wish it to be remembered -
that this is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of alimony.
That has been done by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
court in Wisconsin was asked to interfere to prevent that decree
from being defeated by fraud.
We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance
of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an
incident to divorce a vinculo or to one from bed and board. 6
Practical considerations, however, have necessitated rejection of the
Barber dictum in some non-diversity situations. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that although a federal court has no juris-
diction over domestic relations while sitting as a constitutional court,
it does have jurisdiction when sitting as a territorial court. In Simms
v. Sirnms,7 the Supreme Court accepted an appeal in a divorce case
from the territorial supreme court of Arizona; ' 8 in De La Rama v.
De La Rama,9 the Court granted an appeal in a marital action from
14. Id. at 799.
15. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
16. Id. at 584.
17. 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
18. The appeal was granted on the curious ground that the decree for alimony
and counsel fees was severable from the suit for divorce, and therefore appealable.
Id. at 169.
19. 201 U.S. 303 (1906).
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the supreme court of the Philippines. In both cases the Court approved
the Barber rule as a sound general proposition, but distinguished it
as being applicable only to cases arising under state law.
Another exception to the Barber doctrine has been dictated by
necessity. In 1858 the federal judiciary could disclaim domestic rela-
tions jurisdiction with little practical consequence, since the federal
government had no direct interest in that sphere. Today, however,
the federal courts, as the interpreters of federal income tax and social
security legislation, must decide cases involving domestic relations. In
Wolf v. Gardner,"0 a social security case, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit determined the status of a common law wife under
Ohio law. In Estate of Borax v. Commissioner,2 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that a divorce declared invalid by the state
might still be valid for tax purposes.
Of course, a federal court may also accept jurisdiction over a
domestic relations case where the constitutionality of the state's action
is attacked.22 In Williams v. North Carolina,23 the Supreme Court
considered the extent to which one state must recognize the divorce
decrees of another state to satisfy the full faith and credit clause.
A federal district court, in Davis v. Gately,24 struck down a Delaware
statute prohibiting marriage between whites and blacks as violative
of the fourteenth amendment. A New York federal district court has
recently held, in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,25 that diversity jurisdiction
cannot be granted in a divorce case unless the case presents a con-
stitutional issue. The Rosenstiel court disregarded the distinction,
later to be drawn in Spindel, between actions for divorce and suits
involving the validity of a divorce:
An action to determine the validity of a divorce decree is not
technically a divorce action although, in effect, it determines the
marital relationship of the parties involved. . . . However, in
order for the federal district courts to assume jurisdiction of such
a domestic relations dispute, there must be present the requisite
20. 386 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1967). Accord, Rocker v. Celebrezze, 358 F.2d 119
(2d Cir. 1966). But see Calhoun v. Lange, 40 F. Supp. 264 (D. Md. 1941).
21. 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966). Accord,
Wendsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965).
22. This practice has developed in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court, in
dictum, had indicated that the Barber prohibition extended to all matters concerning
"the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child. In re Burrus,
136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
23. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, disclaimed
any intent to abandon the Barber doctrine:
The problem is to reconcile the reciprocal respect to be accorded by the
members of the Union to their adjudications with due regard for another most
important aspect of our federalism whereby "the domestic relations of husband
and wife . . . were matters reserved to the States." . . . The rights that belong
to all the States and the obligations which membership in the Union imposes upon
all, are made effective because this Court is open to consider claims, such as this
case presents, that the courts of one State have not given the full faith and credit to
the judgment of a sister State that is required by Art. IV, § 1 of the Constitution.
But the discharge of this duty does not make of this Court a court of probate
and divorce.
Id. at 232-33.
24. 269 F. Supp. 996 (D. Del. 1967).
25. 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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diversity of citizenship and satisfaction of the monetary require-
ment imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and a constitutional claim
which is not frivolous.26
The theory, if not the holding, of Rosenstiel is directly opposed to
Spindel. Rosenstiel requires the existence of a constitutional issue
before an action may be brought to determine the validity of a divorce;
Spindel requires only diversity of citizenship and an amount in contro-
versy in excess of the statutory requirement.2
7
Some district courts have accepted diversity jurisdiction over
civil actions which collaterally involve domestic relations, but which
do not require a determination of marital or parental status. For
example, in Daily v. Parker,"5 the Seventh Circuit, in a militantly
progressive opinion, recognized the right of the children of a man
lured away by another woman to bring a tort action against that
temptress in federal court.
Most district courts, however, have enforced the Barber doctrine
in diversity cases. Some have even increased its scope. 29  Thus,
although the Supreme Court apparently limited application of the
rule to cases where a declaration of the marital status was sought,80
in Linscott v. Linscott,"1 a district court refused jurisdiction where
the plaintiff sought only to attack the legitimacy of a property settle-
ment made pursuant to a separation agreement. Similarly, in Berco-
vitch v. Tanburn,32 where a mother-in-law attempted to recover from
her son-in-law sums allegedly expended by her to provide his wife
with necessaries, the district court refused jurisdiction, holding that
this was a prohibited domestic relations case. In Garberson v. Gar-
berson,5 a district court refused jurisdiction in an action for separate
maintenance, despite the fact that it is not certain that the English
chancery courts of 1789, the theoretical models for federal equity
jurisdiction,3 4 lacked jurisdiction to decree separate maintenance, 5
and in spite of the existence of a prior declaration by the state supreme
court that the power to grant separate maintenance was a power in-
herent in a court of equity. 6
26. Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
27. 283 F. Supp. at 799.
28. 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
29. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTzors, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 214 (Wright
ed. 1960) : "The lower courts have applied the principle more broadly, however, and
will not take jurisdiction of cases which can be labelled as 'domestic relations' cases
even where only property rights are involved...."
30. De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906); Walterman v. Taylor,
168 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1948). See Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the
Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L. RZv. 1 (1956). The status-
property rights distinction has been criticized as unworkable and arbitrary. Brandt-
scheit v. Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652, 654 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
31. 98 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Iowa 1951).
32. 103 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
33. 82 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
34. Note 40 infra and accompanying text.
35. Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland Ch. 544 (Md. 1830). See generally Annot.,
141 A.L.R. 399 (1942).
36. Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa 310 (1873); Avery v. Avery, 236 Iowa 9, 17
N.W.2d 820 (1945).
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THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE Barber DOCTRINE
Perhaps the primary reason why the federal courts have been so
unwilling to accept jurisdiction in domestic relations cases even when,
as in Garberson, they arguably might have done so is that they have
been shown no compelling reason for doing so. Their dockets are
already overcrowded; the state courts are readily available and have
developed expertise in the areaY Thus, the Barber doctrine has often
been applied where the courts have found it convenient to do so, and
has not been applied where its application would lead to unaccept-
able results. 38
Although application of the doctrine appears elastic, some of the
reasons cited in its support leave no room for such elasticity. The
most formidable argument against federal jurisdiction in matrimonial
cases is based on the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,"9 which has been
interpreted as limiting the federal courts' equity powers to those
exercised by the English chancery courts in 1789.40 Accordingly, the
argument goes, federal courts have no jurisdiction in divorce cases
because, in 1789, matters of divorce in England were monopolized by
the ecclesiastical courts." However, a study of the old English cases
does show some overlap in divorce jurisdiction between chancery and
the ecclesiastical courts, particularly where the determination of the
marital status was only a collateral issue.42 It has also been suggested
that the retention of divorce jurisdiction in the ecclesiastical courts
after the Reformation was at least partly accidental.43 In any event,
it is illogical to contend that the extent of federal jurisdiction should
be determined by the niceties of eighteenth century chancery jurisdic-
tion. The Congress which passed the Judiciary Act was not primarily
concerned with mimicking English jurisdictional schemes,44 but was
37. See Buechold v. Ortiz, 37 U.S.L.W. 2213 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 1968).
38. See pp. 377-79 supra.
39. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1-35, 1 Stat. 73-93 (now codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
40. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858) ; Fountain v. Ravenal, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1854); Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126
(1844) ; Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835).
41. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 597 (1858). Only Parliament
had the power to grant a divorce a vinculo. The ecclesiastical courts, however, could
only grant a divorce a mensa. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1887).
42. See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
43. See 0. McGREGOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 9-10 (1957).
44. The ecclesiastical courts probably did not inspire imitation. "To pass from
the civil law of Rome to the ecclesiastical law of the Dark and Middle Ages is like
quitting an open country, intersected by good roads, for a tract of mountain and forest
where rough and tortuous paths furnish the only means of transit." J. BRYCE,
MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE 32 (1905).
In England, before the passage of the Divorce Act of 1858, a divorce a vinculo
could be obtained only by procuring the passage of a private act in Parliament, in addi-
tion to the appropriate decrees from both the ecclesiastical and civil courts. The address
of Mr. Justice Maule, delivered in 1845 to a convicted bigamist, has become classic:
You should have brought an action and obtained damages, which the other
side would probably not have been able to pay, and you would have had to pay
your own costs, perhaps a hundred or a hundred and fifty pounds. You should then
have gone to the ecclesiastical courts, and obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro,
and then to the House of Lords, where, having proved that these preliminaries
had been complied with, you would have been enabled to marry again. The
expense might amount to five or six hundred or perhaps a thousand pounds.
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concerned rather with America's particular problems and needs.45 Thejudiciary Act balanced the need for a competent, impartial federaljudiciary 46 against the fear that the state judicaries would be sub-
merged.47 The result was a compromise, born of political practicality,
that pleased no one.4 It could perhaps be argued that the scope of
the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is ultimately determined
not by the Judiciary Act, with its limitation of equity power to that
exercised by English chancery, but by the Constitution itself, which
is subject to no such restriction. This theory is, however, undermined
by the prevailing precepts of the law of federal jurisdiction. As Justice
Chase observed in Turner v. Bank of North America :41
The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal
courts derive their judicial power immediately from the consti-
tution; but the political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial
power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to congress.
If congress has given the power to this court, we possess it, not
otherwise: and if congress has not given the power to us, or to
any other court, it still remains at the legislative disposal. Besides,
congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts, to every subject in
every form, which the constitution might warrant.50
You say you are a poor man. But I must tell you that there is not one law for
the rich and another for the poor.
7 ENCYCLOPgnIA BRITANNICA, Divorce, 260, 262 n.1 (9th ed., Am. Rep. 1878).
45. Indicative of Congress' pragmatic approach is the manner in which the juris-
dictional amount for diversity cases was determined. According to Charles Warren:
It is to be noted that the Circuit Courts were to have no jurisdiction, if the
sum involved did not exceed five hundred dollars. The reason for the fixing of
this particular sum is probably that which was given by a Virginia Representative
in opposition to a change proposed in the Circuit Court Act of 1801, reducing
the sum to four hundred dollars:
"He stated that the estate of Lord Fairfax, withe the quit rents due
thereon, had been confiscated during the Revolution by the State of Virginia;
notwithstanding the confiscation, the heirs of Lord Fairfax had sold all their
rights, which the assignees contended remained unimpaired. It might be their
wish to prosecute in a Federal Court, expecting to gain advantages in it
which could not be had from the Courts of Virginia. His object was to defeat
the purpose by limiting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts to sums beyond
the amount of quit rents alleged to be due by an individual."
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV.
L. REv. 49, 78 (1923).
46. See Friendly, The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L.
REv. 483 (1928). See generally Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judiciary
System, 13 LAW & CONTXMP. PROB. 1 (1948).
47. See 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
172, 220-21 (rev. ed. 1966). See generally Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928).
48. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARV. L. RPv. 49, 53 (1923).
49. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 6 (1799).
50. Id. at 9. But see White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015, 1015-16 (No. 17,547)
(C.C.R.I. 1818) (Story, J.) :
The constitution declares, that it is mandatory to the legislature, that thejudicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies "between the
citizens of different states"; and it is somewhat singular, that the jurisdiction
actually conferred on the courts of the United States should have stopped so far
short of the constitutional extent. That serious mischiefs have already arisen,
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The fact remains, however, that it is totally unreasonable to exclude
federal courts from jurisdiction over all cases involving divorce solely
because in eighteenth century England such cases were reserved for
a forum other than chancery.51 A more realistic approach was sug-
gested by Chief Justice Taney in his concurring opinion in Fountain
v. Ravenal :52
It is true that the courts of chancery of the United States, in
administering the law of a State, may sometimes be called on
to exercise powers which do not belong to courts of equity in
England. And in such cases, if the power is judicial in its char-
acter, and capable of being regulated by the established rules and
principles of a court of equity, there can be no good objection to
its exercise. It falls within the just interpretation of the grant in
the constitution. 53
An alternative argument against the availability of federal juris-
diction in domestic relations cases is that domestic relations are
peculiarly a state concern. 54 Even if this is true, it does not follow
that diversity jurisdiction should be excluded. Diversity jurisdiction
has never been restricted only to the consideration of federal questions.
Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins5 guarantees that the federal
courts will decide diversity cases in accordance with state law, it is
difficult to see how federal diversity jurisdiction could usurp any state
policy-making prerogative in domestic relations cases.
Another argument is raised by the recent case of In re Freiberg,56
in which the court held that although the federal courts have the
power to act in matters concerning domestic relations, they "have
consistently refused to hear any action seeking a determination of
marital and parental status. ' 57 Freiberg was not a case in which the
court could contend that its jurisdiction was precluded by the Judiciary
Act; it was a child custody case, within the traditional jurisdiction
of chancery.' Giving no real reason other than a citation to In re
Burrus, 9 the court exercised its equitable discretion to refuse to hear
the case. In Burrus, the Supreme Court, by way of dictum,6° stated
that: "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
and must continually arise from the present very limited jurisdiction of these
courts, is most manifest to all those, who are conversant with the administration
of justice. But we cannot help them.
See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Story, J.).
51. See Cotter v. Cotter, 225 F. 471 (9th Cir. 1915) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 22 N.M.
192, 159 P. 1007 (1916).
52. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1855).
53. Id. at 393.
54. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) ; In re Burrus, 136 U.S.
586 (1890) ; Druen v. Druen, 247 F. Supp. 754 (D. Colo. 1965).
55. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56. 262 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. La. 1967).
57. Id. at 484.
58. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 117 Mo. 249, 21 S.W. 1122 (1893).
59. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
60. Burrus held only that a district court might not issue a writ of habeas corpus
in a child custody case, absent a constitutional question.
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wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to
the laws of the United States."'" The relevance of that statement to
a post-Erie diversity case appears slight. A district court may refuse
to exercise its equity jurisdiction" or its declaratory judgment power,63
but it is submitted that such refusal should be justified by the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, rather than by a mere recital of
stale precedent.
The arguments directed solely against diversity jurisdiction are
of little weight, especially in situations such as that presented in
Spindel. The argument that the wife can have no domicile apart
from that of the husband is of ancient vintage.64 It was rejected as
early as Barber v. Barber,65 and has been almost uniformly disre-
garded since then.66 The argument that it is impossible to fulfill the
jurisdictional amount in marital cases is slightly more persuasive.6 7
However, property settlements and alimony awards frequently exceed
the required jurisdictional amount. Moreover, a showing of the
necessary amount is not difficult where the. validity of a pre-existing
divorce decree is at issue. For example, a district court granted juris-
diction in a suit challenging the validity of a divorce decree affecting
title to realty held by the parties as tenants by the entireties, where
the parties had a net equity in the property well in excess of the
jurisdictional amount.68
SHOULD DIVERSITY JURISDICTION EXTEND
TO DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES?
The arguments traditionally advanced to justify the refusal to
extend federal diversity jurisdiction to domestic relations cases are
largely unconvincing. It does not follow, however, that federal juris-
diction should be extended to divorce. No federal court has gone so
far as to issue a divorce decree in a diversity case, nor is one likely
to do so. The break with the past would be too radical, the prospective
increase in federal litigation too great. These factors do not, how-
ever, militate against the granting of diversity jurisdiction in cases
where the issuance of a divorce decree is not directly involved, such as
cases testing the validity of a divorce decree or a separation agreement.
The extent of federal jurisdiction has historically been determined
by practical necessity, dependent on such factors as the competence
61. 136 U.S. at 593-94.
62. "[F]ederal courts will not take jurisdiction of domestic relations requiring
exercise of equitable discretion." Forbes v. Galway, 266 F. Supp. 762, 763 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). See also Morris v. Morris, 273 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1960).
63. See Walker v. Felmont Oil Corp., 262 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 840 (1959) ; D.A. Foster Equip. Corp. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 262 F. Supp.
278 (D. Md. 1966).
64. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 600-02 (1858) (dissenting opinion).
65. Id. at 592-99.
66. E.g., Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Iowa 1949). But see
Bowman v. Bowman, 30 F. 849 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887); Shepard v. Ward, 5 N.J. 92,
74 A.2d 279 (1950).
67. See Bowman v. Bowman, 30 F. 849 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1887); Chappell v. Chap-
pell, 86 Md. 532, 39 A. 984 (1898).
68. Rapoport v. Rapoport, 273 F. Supp. 482 (D. Nev. 1967).
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of the state judiciaries and the needs of individual litigants 6 9 This
is especially true where, as in most domestic relations cases, appeal is
made to the court's discretionary equity or declaratory judgment
power. 7° To what extent do such practical considerations militate
against federal jurisdiction in cases not directly involving the issuance
of a divorce decree? The issues presented in such cases may be
vexatious, time consuming and of limited importance. The state
statute to be interpreted may be ambiguous.71 A convenient and im-
partial7 2 state forum may be readily available. An illustrative case,
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court, is Sutton v. Lieb. In that
case an Illinois court awarded the wife alimony until she should
remarry. She subsequently remarried in Nevada, but, after having
that marriage annulled in New York, she remarried again in New
York and sought to recover alimony accruing between her remarriages.
The controlling Illinois statute was unclear and uninterpreted; the
state court was readily available. In short, the case illustrated, as
Justice Frankfurter asserted in his concurring opinion, that "little
excuse is left for diversity jurisdiction."74 The Erie rule may also
discourage the extension of federal diversity jurisdiction to domestic
relations. That case has complicated the role of the federal courts in
deciding diversity actions. The addition of the technical field of domestic
relations to this already complex jurisdictional area may be undesirable.
As former Assistant Attorney General George Cochran Doub observed:
The consequence [of Erie v. Tompkins] is that the federal
court may neither exercise its own judgment as to what the law
69. As then Professor Felix Frankfurter stated:
Not inherent reasons, then, but practical justifications explain the past
judiciary acts and must vindicate existing jurisdiction. The force and dangers
of parochial attachments, the effectiveness and limitations of a centralized
judiciary administering law over a continent, the dependability of state courts,
the convenience of suitors, shifting economic and political sentiments, - such
influences, with varying incidence, have shaped the accommodations of authority
distributed between the national judiciary and the state courts, The present
jurisdiction cannot rely on tradition. Always have the accommodations been
temporary. The only enduring tradition represented by the voluminous body of
congressional enactments governing the federal judiciary is the tradition of ques-
tioning and compromise, of contemporary adequacy and timely fitness.
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 514-15 (1928).
70. See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERA. COURTS
169-77 (1963).
71. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 26A (1966): "In no action for divorce
instituted in this State after June 1, 1965, shall an offer of reconciliation or an attempt
to reconcile by one spouse without the concurrence of the other spouse be available
as a defense to a divorce nor in and of itself be a bar to a divorce." Professor John
Ester of the University of Maryland School of Law criticized the statute as "poorly
worded" and suggested a number of hypotheses where its operation would be, at
best, unclear. J. ESTER, MARYLAND CASES AND MATERIALS ON DomEsTIC RELATIONS
103-04 (1966). Jester v. Jester, 246 Md. 162, 228 A.2d 830 (1967), interpreting that
statute, provided little help in solving these problems. § 26A was amended in 1968.
72. Perhaps the greatest practical advantage of invoking federal diversity juris-
diction is that the aggrieved party does not have to seek justice in the courts of his
adversary's state. See Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L.
REv. 407 (1956).
73. 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
74. Id. at 412.
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should be nor find any reliable state guides to what it is, but
must conjecture as to what a state court would do. Its inquiries
must be: Would the highest state court overrule an old and much-
criticized decision? Would it follow a lower court holding? What
would it do when there is no case in point ?
However, this argument may be double edged. The Erie doctrine
guarantees that state substantive law will be applied in diversity cases;
federal jurisdiction thus would not interfere with state control over
the domestic relations of its citizens.
Furthermore, in situations where jurisdiction over both parties
is required, 78 modern "long arm" statutes have to a certain extent
obviated the need for diversity jurisdiction by enabling a wronged
party to institute suit in his home state. The Maryland Court of
Appeals, in interpreting the New York "long arm" statute in Van
Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg,77 held that a non-domiciliary who
negotiated and executed a settlement agreement in New York, and
who had business contacts in that state, had subjected himself to the
jurisdiction of the New York courts in an action to enforce that
agreement. Maryland's "long arm" statute is very similar to that of
New York.78 Another provision of Maryland's statute may also enable
a resident, fraudulently induced into marriage or divorce by a spouse
who has since fled the jurisdiction, to institute suit against the offend-
ing spouse in the Maryland courts. 79 To the extent that the use of
"long arm" statutes may not afford the non-resident defendant the
same degree of impartiality as would a resort to the federal courts,
the statutes may not completely remove the need for diversity juris-
diction. However, it is submitted that state courts today are not
hopelessly prejudiced against the non-resident."0 If substantial prejudice
75. Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?,
44 A.B.A.J. 243, 246 (1958). But cf. Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts,
51 Nw. U.L. REv. 407 (1956).
76. Personal jurisdiction over both parties is typically not required in actions for
divorce. E.g., MD. ANN. CoDs art. 16, §§ 22, 30 (1966). However, such jurisdiction
may be required in other civil actions between spouses springing out of the marital
relationship. E.g., Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 833 (1966).
77. 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 833 (1966) (suit to enforce
separation agreement).
78. Hardy v. Rekab, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 508, 514 n.12 (D. Md. 1967): "Section
96(a) (1) [MD. ANN. CODt art. 75] of the Maryland Act is verbatim the same as
section 1.03(a) (1) of the Uniform Act, which, in turn, is derived from the Illinois
Act .... The New York provision is substantially the same. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law &
Rules § 302(a) (1) (McKinney 1966 Supp.)."
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 96(a)(3) (1965).
80. Doub, Time For Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?,
44 A.B.A.J. 243, 245 (1958):
The assumption that a non-resident will be treated unfairly in state courts
now seems to many an unworthy reproach and reflection upon our well-organized
state judicial systems. Our national feelings, the mobility of modern life, interstate
media of communication and our foreign wars all have diluted our state attach-
ments. Congress has manifested its confidence in state courts not only by providing
for concurrent jurisdiction of federal question cases involving more than $3,000
and exclusive state court jurisdiction of federal question cases involving less than
$3,000, but even more emphatically by prohibiting removal of Federal Employers'
Liability Act and Jones Act cases where the plaintiff has chosen the state court.
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does exist, such prejudice should be grounds for removal to the federal
district court.8 '
In conclusion, it seems that neither the Federal Judiciary Act,
nor the theory that domestic relations are peculiarly a state concern,
nor the concept of a judicially created exception, bars federal courts
from accepting diversity jurisdiction over domestic relations cases.
The real considerations are pragmatic. State courts are more familiar
with local domestic relations legislation and case law; federal courts
could not handle the increased workload of divorce litigation. How-
ever, time has seemingly transformed the Barber doctrine into absolute
fiat: there shall be no federal diversity jurisdiction over cases involving
domestic relations.8 2 This apparent rigidity may prevent a district
court from accepting jurisdiction even where such jurisdiction would be
beneficial.8 3 Acceptance of the approach espoused in Spindel would con-
tribute badly needed flexibility to the operation of the Barber doctrine.
81. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 235 (1948). Some federal judges would abolish diversityjurisdiction except for removal to a federal court by a non-resident defendant upon
a showing that "from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice
in such State courts." Id. at 236 n.98.
82. But see notes 17-24 supra and accompanying text.
83. In one case, for example, the plaintiff contended unsuccessfully that the cost
of bringing suit in the state courts was "prohibitive." Brandtscheit v. Britton, 239 F.
Supp. 652, 655 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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